



INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
Mukarrum Ahmed* 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will begin by evaluating the theoretical issue that lies at the crux of the 
relationship between international law and municipal law.1 This will be followed by an 
assessment of the role of municipal law in international law and the reception of international 
law in English municipal law. A key feature of this chapter is a unique consideration of how 
Pakistani courts assimilate international law into the domestic legal system. The chapter will 
highlight that the interaction between international law and domestic law is increasing as a 
result of globalisation. It will be argued that a broad internationalist spirit is vital for the 
progressive application of international law in Pakistani courts.  
 The analysis of the complex juridical relationship between international law and 
municipal law is useful from two perspectives.2 The relationship sheds light on the general 
concept of law and legal system. Simultaneously, it offers insights into the foundations, 
structure and sources of international law. The philosophically unresolved problem whether 
international law and municipal law are constituent of a single universal legal system or 
multiple independent legal systems has been a pervasive issue. Monism believes in a 
progressive internationalisation of national law inspired by aspects of natural law 
jurisprudence, whereas, dualism emphasises a legal positivist notion of state sovereignty 
which requires a municipal legislative act to bring international law into effect in a national 
legal system.3 The Westphalian model of sovereignty characterised by positivist international 
law theory conceives ‘state sovereignty’ as states possessing some unrestricted freedoms as 
an a priori consequence of their statehood.4 This freedom is said to exist prior to law, thus 
positivists argue that international law can only exist as an expression of state sovereign will. 
States are viewed as the key actors in the formation of international law.  
 The subject of considerable debate in the first half of the twentieth century, monism 
and dualism are regarded by many modern scholars as having limited explanatory power as 
theories because of their failure to capture how international law works within states in 
practice. Indeed, one of the main critiques of both theories is that no state’s system is strictly 
                                                          
* Dr Mukarrum Ahmed is Lecturer in Business Law at Lancaster University and a Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn. 
1 In this chapter, the terms ‘municipal’, ‘national’, ‘domestic’ and ‘internal’ are used synonymously to refer to 
the legal system of a state. 
2 See generally, Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (8th Edition, Cambridge University Press 2017); James 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th Edition, OUP 2019); Rüdiger Wolfrum, The 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2nd Edition, OUP 2013); Shaheed Fatima, Using 
International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart Publishing 2005); Malcolm Evans, International Law (5th Edition, 
OUP 2018).  
3 For a discussion of ‘natural law’ and ‘legal positivism’, see, James W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd Edition, 
Butterworths 1997).  
4 John Austin was a nineteenth century English legal positivist who conceived the sovereign as a pre-legal 
political fact, in terms of which law and all legal concepts are definable. See Harris (n 3) 36. 
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monist or dualist. Notwithstanding their decline as theories, monism and dualism retain 
significance as analytical tools. They will serve as a consistent starting point for the 
examination of the relationship between international and municipal law in this chapter. 
 Dualism emphasises the independent and separate character of the international and 
national legal systems.5 International law is viewed as regulating the relationship between 
states, whereas, municipal law applies within a State, regulating the relations of its citizens 
inter partes and with the state. Neither legal order has the power to encroach upon the rules 
of the other. When an international law rule applies, a rule of the national legal system has 
authorised the application of that rule. In the case of a conflict between international law and 
national law, the dualist would assume that a national court would apply national law. 
 According to monism, national and international law form one single universal legal 
system. As a result, international law can be applied directly without any municipal 
legislative act authorising the application of international law in the national legal system. 
There is no single definitive creed of monism but several varieties thereof.  
4.2. The Philosophical Problem 
This section will examine monism and dualism as two opposing conceptions of the concept 
of the relationship between international law and municipal law.6 When the discussion of the 
issue arose at the end of the nineteenth century, international relations between the fledging 
nation states were relatively unsophisticated. Heinrich Triepel conducted a study of the 
emergent international legal order.7 He concluded that the rules of international law in force 
concerned fields of application other than those of relevance to municipal law. Secondly, the 
main sources of international law were based exclusively on the express consent of states. 
Thirdly, the subjects of international law were exclusively states. 
 Since the Second World War, fundamental changes have occurred which have 
superseded the factual basis for Triepel’s study. The modern development of international 
law has created a large number of new vertical norms for states. As a result, the subject-
matter within the municipal jurisdiction of states has receded. It is no longer possible to 
clearly demarcate separate fields of application for international and municipal legal norms. 
For instance, the multi-layered private international law (conflict of laws) rules of the 
European Union (EU) Member States reflect the diverse competence of the municipal, 
supranational and international legal order.8 Human rights law is another area where 
                                                          
5 The international and municipal legal systems under dualism can be loosely compared to hermetically sealed 
units. 
6 A distinction between the terms ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ is drawn by the author in this chapter in the sense 
frequently employed by Dworkin in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 71 – 72; 
The distinction was openly adopted by Rawls in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 
1971) ch 5. 
7 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Hirschfeldt, Leipzig 1899). 
8 The classification of private international law as municipal law occurred in the late nineteenth century. The 
resulting monolithic conception of international law is partly a product of the emphasis on the conception of 
state ‘sovereignty’ in legal positivist international legal theory, which classified the decision of states with 
respect to private international law disputes as a matter of discretionary comity. Both private law and private 
international law were excluded from the domain of international law. See Mukarrum Ahmed, The Nature and 
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overlapping legal competence exists between the international and municipal legal system. 
Therefore, the idea that separate fields of application exist with no interpenetration between 
international and municipal law no longer corresponds with reality. 
 Triepel’s study neglected the fact that customary international law forms part of both 
international law and municipal law and illustrates interpenetrative influences.9 Moreover, the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations cannot be deemed to emanate 
exclusively from either the international or municipal legal system. The international law-
making process has diversified and it is no longer necessary to have recourse to examples 
from supranational legal orders, such as the EU, to find sources not based on the express will 
of states. HLA Hart, when discussing the nature of international law and the possible 
formulation of a ‘basic norm’ of international law, has discussed the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda as a potential candidate.10 However, he reasoned that this view has been abandoned 
by many theorists and it is incompatible with the fact that not all obligations under 
international law arise from ‘pacta’, however widely the term is construed.11 It should be 
noted that Hart recognised that regulatory constraints played at least some role within an 
emerging international legal order.12 Therefore, pacta sunt servanda based on the consent of 
states does not offer a satisfactory and comprehensive justification of the customary 
behaviour of states in international law.  
 Triepel’s third finding concerns the subjects of international law. The recognition that 
international organisations have become subjects and that individuals may exceptionally be 
made not only its addressees, but also its subjects, reflects the emergence of a cosmopolitan 
conception of sovereignty.13 The argument that international law rules are exclusively 
addressed to states is therefore no longer realistic. 
 The criticisms of dualism are not sufficient to reason that the whole doctrine is 
fallacious and anachronistic. Dualists frequently argue that international courts only apply 
sources of international law and characterise municipal law as a question of ‘fact’.14 They can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing 2017) 14-21. It should be 
noted that dualism is also modelled on the legal positivist notion of state sovereignty that was prevalent in the 
late nineteenth century.  
9 Triepel (n 7). 
10 Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 228. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid 231; See also, James E Penner, McCoubrey & White’s Textbook on Jurisprudence (4th Edition, OUP 
2008) 98. 
13 See Alex Mills, ‘Normative Individualism and Jurisdiction in Public and Private International Law: Towards 
a Cosmopolitan Sovereignty’ (Inaugural Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law Conference: 
Agents of Change: The Individual as a Participant in the Legal Process, Cambridge, 19 May 2012); Alex Mills, 
‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International Law 187. 
14 Foreign law is also a question of ‘fact’ in private international law disputes before English courts. A party 
relying on foreign law has to plead and prove the content of the foreign applicable law. If foreign law is not 
pleaded or proved, the English court will apply English law to the dispute. On the other hand, civil law legal 
systems characterise foreign law as a question of law. See Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts 
(OUP 1998); Sofie Geeroms, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation (OUP 2004). English private international lawyers 
often justify the treatment of foreign law as pragmatic, efficient and in accordance with party autonomy but the 
relegation of foreign law in English courts might also be explained with the idea of dualism and a legal positivist 
notion of state sovereignty, where the applicable foreign law of another state exists separately and independently 
of English law.   
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rely on dicta of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) to conclude that municipal law does not belong to the same legal 
order as international law. 
 All forms of monism are premised on the idea that ‘law’ has to be understood as a 
unity and that its validity has to be derived from one common source. Theoretically, this 
hypothesis is fulfilled whether this common source is found in the national or international 
level.15 However, the assumption that national law could constitute the common source for 
international law results in the negation of the international legal order. This chapter only 
considers those monistic theories which accept the precedence of international law. 
 Hans Kelsen advanced the idea that the final source of validity of all law had to be 
found in a basic rule (grundnorm) of international law:16  
“Since the basic norms of the national legal orders are determined by a norm of 
international law, they are basic norms only in a relative sense. It is the basic norm of 
the international legal order which is the ultimate reason of validity of the national 
legal orders, too.”17 
The legal order of municipal law is derived from international law by way of delegation.18 All 
norms of international law are superior to municipal law, and municipal law contrary to 
international law is void. The norms of international law are directly applicable in the 
municipal legal system. This idea of a basic rule as the ultimate source of all law reflects the 
influence of the Vienna Circle’s theory of logical positivism.19  
 Hersch Lauterpacht was a vehement advocate of a different form of monism. He 
emphasised that individuals are the ultimate subjects of international law. As such, 
individuals represent both the justification and moral limit of the legal order.20 International 
law is seen as the best available moderator of human affairs, and also as a condition of the 
legal existence of states, and therefore of the national legal systems.21 
                                                          
15 See François Rigaux, ‘Hans Kelsen on International Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 
325. 
16 Cf Hart (n 10) ch 10, rejected the positivist account of international law because of the dependence on the 
problematic conception of sovereignty. He argued that international law is simply a set of primary rules which 
creates obligations, rejecting the idea that a priori norms such as sovereignty operate as a rule of recognition or 
as a justification of those rules. John Austin excluded international law from the province of jurisprudence and 
positive law by referring to it as ‘positive morality’, see WL Morison, John Austin (Edward Arnold 1982) 64.  
17 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945) 367, 369-370; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International 
Law (2nd edn, 1966) 562; See also, Penner (n 12) 51-52. 
18 Harris (n 3) 74.  
19 ‘Logical positivism’ is a twentieth century philosophical movement holding that all meaningful statements are 
either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least confirmable by observation and experiment and that 
metaphysical theories are therefore strictly meaningless. The Vienna Circle’s formulation was entirely driven by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Kegan Paul 1922), which dominated analytical 
philosophy in the 1920s and 30s. 
20 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950) 70. 




 According to Kelsen, the authority of states to exercise jurisdiction in their territory is 
delegated from international law. However, the actual interaction between international and 
municipal law does not support this finding. International law is rarely concerned with the 
jurisdiction of states to regulate their domestic affairs. If the basis for international law as 
well as for municipal law is found in the consciousness of a legal community or in “the idea 
of law”,22 the artificial conception of a delegation of authority to states is not needed. In this 
connection, a parallel can be drawn with federal states. The legal community of the same 
people constitutes the basis for the federal state and for the legal systems of its constituent 
elements. By analogy, the national legal communities form the international community. 
 According to radical monism, the supremacy of international law is not limited to the 
international level but equally determines its application on the municipal plane. Legal 
provisions of the municipal legal order which are inconsistent with international obligations 
are void. The theory of the supremacy of international law within the universal and unique 
legal order covering all levels is sufficient to constitute a basis for this result. State practice 
which is not in conformity with this doctrine is regarded as irrelevant and must be changed. 
 A revised theory has taken into account several criticisms based on an analysis of 
state practice. This moderate monism does not insist on the conception of a delegated power 
of states, but rather emphasises the fact that international law determines a margin of action 
for each state which delineates its liberty of action.23 Municipal law inconsistent with 
international obligations is not automatically void. The supremacy of international law is 
nevertheless maintained in the sense that the state is bound by international law when 
exercising its jurisdiction and that a statute which does not conform to international standards 
may only be applied provisionally by national courts until the state fulfils its duty to bring it 
into conformity with its international obligations. In the case of treaty obligations, any party 
to the relevant convention whose own rights are affected may request a revision of the 
municipal law. Some modern developments have made provision for bringing municipal law 
into conformity with international law.24 
 The argument for a ‘provisional validity’ of norms of municipal law which do not 
comply with international obligations has been criticised by the opponents of monism. In 
their opinion, a general procedure established by international law would be necessary in 
order to ensure the conformity between municipal and international law. As long as such a 
procedure does not exist, one cannot refer to the validity of international law in the municipal 
plane without having recourse to the authority of the state in order to form a basis for the 
application of international law in domestic courts.25 
                                                          
22 E Kaufmann ‘Traité international et loi interne’ (1958) 41 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 369–89. 
23 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max 
Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2nd Edition, OUP 2013) [17]. 
24 For example, in the UK, a judge can issue a declaration under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that a 
statute is incompatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) (1950). 
25 Dupuy (n 23) [18]. 
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 Arguments drawn from state practice have led to a revision of both monism and 
dualism theories. The direct application of international law by state courts is no longer a 
point of contention. Such direct application cannot be based solely on a monistic conception 
but rather on some form of dualism. A national legal order can refer to another legal order 
and provide for the application of that order’s norms without incorporating them into its own 
legal system. The main remaining divergence between monism and dualism relates to the 
influence of international law on national statutes which are not in conformity with 
international law. Monists, having revised their original theory, now insist on the existence of 
an international responsibility of states to bring domestic law into conformity with 
international law. This responsibility is regarded as proof of the pre-eminence of international 
law. 
 Dualists lay emphasis on the absence of formal sanctions. They regard it as decisive 
that the revocation of such norms remains in the competence of the state. A state’s 
international responsibility does not render a statute void, and a judgment of an international 
court may only impose the duty to pay reparations. The relevance attributed to state 
responsibility for the relations between international law and municipal law is therefore a 
central feature of this debate. 
 In general, common law commentators have not laid the same emphasis on theoretical 
problems. Gerald Fitzmaurice even stated that “the entire monist-dualist controversy is 
unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point”.26 Instead of maintaining the dogmatic 
controversy, contemporary scholars consider it more important to contribute to a solid 
foundation of international law as a legal order.27 The next two sections examine the role of 
municipal law in international law and the reception of international law in English municipal 
law. 
4.3. The Application of Municipal Law in International Law 
A state cannot plead provisions of its own law or lacunas in that law in answer to a claim 
against it for a breach of its international law obligations.28 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice have endorsed this position.29 This 
                                                          
26 Gerald Fitzmaurice ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule 
of Law’ (1957) 92 (2) Recueil des cours 1–227, 71. 
27 Dupuy (n 23) [22]. 
28 Art 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331), referring to 
justification for failure to perform a treaty. Cf Art 46, VCLT, permitting a state to argue the invalidation of 
consent by reason of the violation of its internal law where the violation was ‘manifest and concerned a rule of 
its internal law of fundamental importance’. 
29 PCIJ: SS Wimbledon (1923) PCIJ Ser A No 1, 29; Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (1928) PCIJ Ser B No 
15, 26–7; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (1930) PCIJ Ser A No 24, 12; ICJ: Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 132; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, ICJ Reports 1988  12, 34; Elettronica Sicula 
SpA (ELSI) (US v Italy), ICJ Reports 1989 p 15, 51, 74; Avena (Mexico v US), ICJ Reports 2004 p 12, 65; 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), ICJ Reports 2012 p 422, 460. 
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principle is reflected in Article 3 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:30 
“The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the 
same act as lawful by internal law.” 
The classification of applicable municipal law in international adjudication under 
international law is disputable. Municipal norms cannot be equated with international law 
norms in terms of pedigree. However, municipal law may be characterised as issues of ‘fact’ 
with quasi-normative implications by an international court or tribunal. Until recently, the 
PCIJ’s statement in 1926 in the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases was regarded 
as answering this question:31 
“From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, 
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of 
States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.” 
A refined definition of this relationship, expressed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, 
is less restrictive:32  
“Thus the Court has … not only to take cognizance of municipal law but also to refer 
to it … In referring to such rules, the Court cannot modify, still less deform them”. 
The difference between the two positions is clear. The court may only take cognisance of 
facts if they are raised and proved by a party. If reference is made to sources of municipal 
law, this implies that a quasi-normative character is attributed to them. It should be noted that 
in the Serbian Loans case the PCIJ even stated that the court, under certain conditions, “is 
obliged to apply municipal law”.33 
 In the Barcelona Traction case, the recognition of an institution of municipal law, 
namely of a limited company, was at issue. The Court took its decision in view of the fact 
that “international law has not established its own rules” for this legal issue.34 Judge 
Fitzmaurice even spoke of the municipal system which the Court “sought to apply on the 
international plane”,35 while other members of the Court felt inclined to defend the traditional 
conceptions and terminology.36  
 A legal basis for the application of judicial precedent developed by municipal courts 
can be found in the principle of a reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. However, the 
                                                          
30 ILC Yearbook 2001/II (2), 36. Also, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 375(IV), 6 
December 1949, Art 13. 
31 PCIJ (1926) Ser A No 7, 19. 
32 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain), Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 37. 
33 Serbian Loans (1929) PCIJ Ser A No 20, [242]. 
34 Barcelona Traction (n 32) 34. 
35 ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, 72. 
36 ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Morelli, 233–234; Separate Opinion of Judge Gros, 272. 
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principle of iura novit curia does not apply in cases where an international court or tribunal 
refers to municipal law.37  
4.4. The Application of International Law in Municipal Law 
This section examines the application of international law within the municipal legal 
system.38 In particular, treaties must be distinguished from customary international law as 
sources of international law. Treaties are written agreements that are signed and ratified by 
contracting states and binding on them. Customary international law consists of those rules 
that have arisen as a consequence of practices engaged in by states. The analysis of the 
reception of international law in the United Kingdom (UK) in this part is followed by a novel 
consideration of how the Pakistani legal system incorporates international law.   
 According to the principle of ‘incorporation’, international law was part of the law of 
England.39 However, this liberal approach was subject to qualifications. Parliamentary 
supremacy meant that treaties concluded by a royal prerogative were not part of English law. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the ‘act of state’ doctrine, the executive had authority in 
matters of the foreign prerogative (notably recognition). It is now necessary to examine the 
application of treaties and customary international law in English domestic law. 
4.4.1. Treaties 
In England, conclusion and ratification of treaties are subject to the royal prerogative, but 
Parliament has to legislate to incorporate a treaty into UK law.40 This approach of English 
law is broadly reflected in other Commonwealth countries such as Pakistan. The rule does not 
apply in the very rare cases where the Crown’s prerogative can directly extend without the 
need for legislation.41 
 As a dualist system, English law will not ordinarily permit unimplemented treaties to 
be given legal effect by the courts.42 A concise statement of this rule was provided by the 
Privy Council in Thomas v Baptiste:43 
“Their Lordships recognise the constitutional importance of the principle that 
international conventions do not alter domestic law except to the extent that they are 
incorporated into domestic law by legislation. The making of a treaty … is an act of 
                                                          
37 Iura novit curia: “The court knows the laws” in Aaron X Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in 
International Law (OUP 2011). 
38 Art 38(1) ICJ Statute: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
39 See generally, Shaw (n 2) Ch 4; Crawford (n 2) Ch 3. 
40 ‘The bedrock of the British constitution’: R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262, 274 (Lord 
Bingham). 
41 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 500. 
42 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 499–500 (Lord Oliver). 
43 [2000] 2 AC 1 (PC), 23 (Lord Millett); ibid, 31–33 (Lord Hoffmann & Lord Goff). 
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the executive government, not of the legislature. It follows that the terms of a treaty 
cannot effect any alteration to domestic law or deprive the subject of existing legal 
rights unless and until enacted into domestic law by or under authority of the 
legislature. When so enacted, the courts give effect to the domestic legislation, not to 
the terms of the treaty.” 
Therefore, according to the principle of ‘no direct effect’, unimplemented treaties cannot 
create enforceable rights.44 In similar vein, unimplemented treaties cannot override statutes 
and their infringement by the UK is domestically without legal effect. Decisions by 
international courts and tribunals which adjudicate the UK to be in breach of unimplemented 
treaty obligations have no domestic effect.45 
 Once a treaty is implemented by Parliament, the resulting legislation becomes part of 
UK law and is applicable in the courts.46 The statute implementing the treaty will function as 
any other Act of Parliament. Thus, for example, the words of a subsequent Act of Parliament 
will prevail over the provisions of a prior treaty in the case of clear inconsistency between the 
two.47 
 An apparent exception to the treaty incorporation principle are treaties concluded by 
the institutions of the European Union (EU), with the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) 
holding these to be directly enforceable within Member States as part of the acquis 
communautaire.48 However, EU treaties have this effect in UK law because of the relevant 
statute.49 The EU’s institutional structure and legal order is sui generis,50 EU Treaties and 
Regulations are directly applicable as they come into force without any action on the part of 
Member States.51 The principles of supremacy52 of EU law and the direct effect53 of EU law 
                                                          
44 Ss 20–22, The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, provide for prior parliamentary approval of 
treaty ratification in most cases, but it does not change the no direct effect rule. 
45 R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976, 987 (Lord Bingham), 995 (Lord Hoffmann). 
46 A clear example of this is Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which gives qualified domestic 
effect to the ECHR. 
47 IRC v Collco Dealings Ltd [1962] AC 1; Woodend (KV Ceylon) Rubber and Tea Co v IRC [1971] AC 321. 
48 The acquis communautaire is the collective legal term for EU law. It stands for the whole body of written and 
unwritten EU laws, the EU’s political aims, and the obligations, rights, and remedies the Member States share 
and must adhere to with regard to the EU. See Meinhard Hilf, ‘Acquis communautaire’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed), The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2nd Edition, OUP 2013) [1].  
49 See European Communities Act 1972 (UK). 
50 Paul Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law: Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 710.  
51 The principle of direct applicability refers to the extent to which EU measures take effect in the legal system 
of each Member State without the need for further implementation by the Member States themselves. Authority 
for this interpretation is Art 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which states 
specifically that a Regulation “shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”. 
Therefore, Regulations shall take effect in the legal system of each Member State without the need for any 
further implementation. 
52 In Costa v ENEL (6/64) [1964] ECR 585 the ECJ espoused the principle of supremacy of EU law and stated 
that EU law could not “be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of 
its character as [Union] law and without the legal basis of the [Union] itself being called into question”. See 
Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th Edition, OUP 2011) ch 9. 
53 The principle of direct effect can be interpreted as meaning the extent to which EU law can produce legal 
rights and obligations which can be used in an action before a national court. The ECJ decision in Van Gend en 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (26/62) [1963] ECR 1, [1963] CMLR 105 states that 
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are both based on the competence of the EU. The CJEU has jurisdiction to interpret EU law 
through the preliminary reference procedure from the courts of the Member States of the 
EU.54 
 When interpreting the instrument enabling the treaty, it should be noted that the object 
of interpretation is at one remove from the treaty.55 Accordingly, although international 
courts and tribunals may rule on the interpretation of a treaty, their rulings are not binding on 
the interpretation of the enabling instrument.56 
On the other hand, treaty interpretation is based on the requirements of Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties at least for states bound by the 
Convention.57 In the interests of the uniform interpretation of the relevant treaty, the 
decisions of other national courts on the interpretation of treaties are taken into account.58 
 Diplock LJ noted in that “Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international 
law, including therein specific treaty obligations.”59 In addition to legislation, the 
presumption may also apply to other instruments or guidelines given domestic effect.60 
The presumption itself will only act as an aid to interpretation where the statutory provision is 
open textured and lacks prima facie clarity. In Ex p Brind, Lord Bridge, having regard to the 
then unimplemented European Convention on Human Rights, said:61 
“[I]n construing any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous in the sense 
that it is capable of a meaning which either conforms to or conflicts with the 
Convention, the courts will presume that Parliament intended to legislate in 
conformity with the Convention, not in conflict with it. Hence, it is submitted, when a 
statute confers upon an administrative authority a discretion capable of being 
exercised in a way which infringes any basic human right protected by the 
Convention, it may similarly be presumed that the legislative intention was that the 
discretion should be exercised within the limitations which the Convention imposes.” 
Interpreting English law in a way which does not place the UK in breach of an international 
obligation also applies to the common law.62 Unincorporated treaties may be used to develop 
the common law particularly where there is a lacuna in the law. For instance, the English 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“[Union] law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals”. See 
Craig and De Burca (n 52) ch 7. 
54 Art 267 TFEU; See Craig and De Burca (n 52) ch 13. 
55 Shaw (n 2) 118; Crawford (n 2) 61. 
56 ibid. 
57 See Arts 31 and 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331). 
Reference to the travaux préparatoires is allowed under Art 32 if the meaning of a Convention is ‘ambiguous or 
obscure’ from the application of Art 31 or if it confirms the meaning arrived at from the application of Art 31. 
58 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shah [1999] 2 AC 629, 657 (Lord Hoffmann). 
59 Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116, 143. 
60 Mirza v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] Imm AR 314 (CA), 318 (Nourse LJ). 
61 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, 747–8; cf ibid, 760 (Lord 
Ackner). 
62 R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976, 992 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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courts have considered treaty based human rights standards to adjudicate on common law 
issues.63 
4.4.2. Customary International Law 
The common law approach to customary international law64 is that of ‘incorporation’, under 
which customary rules are considered to be ‘part of the law of the land’ provided they are not 
inconsistent with Acts of Parliament. Lord Denning’s statement in Trendtex Trading Corp v 
Central Bank of Nigeria is usually cited in support of the proposition:65 
“Seeing that the rules of international law have changed—and do change—and that 
the courts have given effect to the changes without any Act of Parliament, it follows 
… inexorably that the rules of international law, as existing from time to time, do 
form part of English law.” 
Lord Wilberforce, however, cautioned that it may be wise not to adhere to “the admired 
judgment of Lord Denning MR than is necessary”.66 The position in England is not that 
custom forms part of the common law, but that it is a source of English law that the courts 
may draw upon as required.67 
As Lord Bingham said in R v Jones (Margaret):68 
“The appellants contended that the law of nations in its full extent is part of the law of 
England and Wales. The Crown did not challenge the general truth of this proposition, 
for which there is indeed old and high authority … I would for my part hesitate … to 
accept this proposition in quite the unqualified terms in which it has often been stated. 
There seems to be truth in Brierly’s contention … that international law is not a part, 
but is one of the sources, of English law.” 
4.5. International Law in Pakistani Courts 
Pakistan is a dualist state. Dualism approaches municipal and international law as separate 
and independent systems that only overlap where international law is incorporated through 
legislative action into municipal law.69 For the Pakistani courts, in many instances, executive 
action does not suffice.70 The Supreme Court of Pakistan has found that where treaty 
provisions are not incorporated through legislation into the black letter law of the state, they 
do not ‘have the effect of altering the existing laws,’ which means ‘rights arising therefrom 
called treaty rights cannot be enforced’ and ‘the Court is not vested with the power to do 
                                                          
63 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No 2) [1979] 1 Ch 344, 379 (Megarry V-C); Gleaves v Deakin 
[1980] AC 477; Attorney-General v BBC [1981] AC 303; Cheall v Association of Professional Executive 
Clerical and Computer Staff [1983] 2 AC 180. 
64 Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010) ch 10. 
65 [1977] QB 529, 554. 
66 I Congreso del Partido [1983] AC 244, 261–2. 
67 James L Brierly, ‘International Law in England’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 24, 31. 
68 [2007] 1 AC 136, 155. 
69 SGS Societe Generale v Pakistan ((2002) CLD (Lahore) 790) Muhammad Saeed Akhtar J. 
70 ibid. Treaties are concluded in Pakistan without parliamentary oversight. See Ahmad Ghouri, ‘Democratizing 
Foreign Policy: Parliamentary Oversight of Treaty Ratification in Pakistan’ (2019) 40 Statute Law Review.  
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so.’71 In support of this statement, the Pakistani courts refer to Article 175(2) of the 
Constitution of Pakistan:72 “No court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be 
conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law.” 
A number of Pakistani decisions support the proposition that international law needs to be 
legislatively incorporated in the Pakistani municipal legal system for it to be effective: 
“An international agreement between the nations, if signed by any country, is always 
subject to ratification, but it can be enforced as a law only when legislation is made by 
the country through its legislature. Without framing a law in terms of the international 
agreement of covenants of such agreement cannot be implemented as a law nor do 
they bind down any party.”73 
“It is well settled proposition of law that international treaties and convention, unless 
incorporated in the municipal laws, the same cannot be enforced domestically.”74 
“Where there is a conflict between a municipal law and any provisions of an 
international convention, which has not been legislated or enacted, the provisions of 
municipal law shall prevail.”75 
Surprisingly, some Pakistani court rulings support the erroneous proposition that municipal 
law is superior in pedigree to international law.  
“We are not to lose sight of the established legal principal prevalent in our legal 
jurisdiction that when international obligations and bilateral commitments come in 
conflict with municipal laws, the later are to prevail.”76 
“We are inclined to hold that the absence of any provisions in the relevant [domestic] 
law, the Pakistani courts are not entitled to take note of the factum of violation of any 
provisions of international agreement or law, the Pakistani courts are bound to give 
effect to the municipal law as they are.”77 
It is argued that it will be difficult to “fit” future Pakistani decisions into the aberrational 
foundations of the preceding strain of case law because a better “justification” for the law 
based on sound principle can be found.78 A “justification” for the application of international 
law in Pakistani courts that is internationalist in spirit and does not envisage the Pakistani 
                                                          
71 Societe General De Surveillance S.A. v Pakistan ((2002) SCMR (Supreme Court) 1694, [23]) Munir A Sheikh 
J. 
72 Article 175(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Last amended on 31 May 2018). 
73 Shehla Zia v WAPDA ((1994) PLD (Supreme Court) 693) Nasim Hasan Shah CJ, Saleem Akhtar and 
Manzoor Hussain Sial JJ. 
74 Govt. of Punjab v Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq ((2016) PLD (Supreme Court) 421) Anwar Zaheer Jamali CJ, Mian 
Saqib Nisar, Iqbal Hameedur Rahman, Umar Ata Bandial and Qazi Faez Isa JJ. 
75 Commander Aziz Khan v Director General, Ports and Shipping ((1991) CLC (Karachi) 362) Saleem Akhtar 
and Imam Ali Kazi JJ. 
76 Ahtabar Gul v State ((2014) PLD (Peshawar) 10) Yahya Afridi and Syed Afsar Shah JJ. 
77 Indus Automobile v. Central Board of Revenue ((1988) PLD (Karachi) 99) Ajmal Mian and Allahdino G 
Memon JJ. 
78 For the ideas of “fit” and “justification” in the adjudication of “hard cases”, see, Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013) ch 4. 
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judiciary as insular and parochial. Indeed, an enlightened and inclusive approach to the 
application of international law in Pakistani courts may be based on the idea of upholding 
fundamental rights and the rule of law. This awareness of international law’s utility in 
enforcing fundamental rights and the rule of law is reflected in Pakistani court rulings:   
“We are of the view that nations must march with international community and the 
municipal law must respect rules of international law, even as nations respect 
international opinion. The comity of nations requires that rules of international law 
may be accommodated in the municipal law even without express legislative sanction 
provided they do not run into conflict [with acts of Parliament].”79 
“The Fundamental Rights enshrined in our Constitution in fact reflect what has been 
provided in [the] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It may be observed that this 
Court while construing the former may refer to the latter if there is no inconsistency 
between the two with the object to place liberal construction as to extend maximum 
benefits to the people and to have uniformity with the comity of nations.”80 
“It is by now settled that International Law, unless in direct conflict with the 
municipal law, ought to be applied and respected by municipal courts in deciding 
matters arising therefrom.”81 
“Every statute is to be so interpreted and applied as far as its language admits, as not 
to be inconsistent with the comity of nations, or with the established rules of 
international law…”82 
“National courts should strive for uniformity in the interpretation of 
treaties/conventions and therefore the case-law developed in other jurisdictions can 
and ought to be taken into consideration by courts of the states party to such 
treaties.”83 
Pakistani courts are also aware of their responsibility to uphold the international obligations 
of the state, including recognising the potential consequences of breaching such obligations.84 
Parliament frequently refers to international law and international organisations in the 
municipal laws of Pakistan. As Parliament accepts the influence of international law on 
municipal law and the integration of both legal orders in domestic law, the judiciary should 
also be keen to adopt an enlightened and inclusive approach to international law to uphold the 
rule of law and fundamental rights. 
                                                          
79 Najib Zarab Ltd. v Pakistan ((1993) PLD (Karachi) 93) Syed Haider Ali Pirzada and Shaukat Hussain Zubedi 
JJ. 
80 Al-Jehad Trust v Federation of Pakistan ((1999) SCMR (Supreme Court) 1379) Ajmal Mian CJ, Muhammad 
Bashir Jehangiri, Mamoon Kazi, Ch Muhammad Arif and Munir A Sheikh JJ. 
81 Haji Lal Muhammad v Pakistan ((2014) PLD (Peshawar) 199) Yahya Afridi and Malik Manzoor Hussain JJ. 
82 Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v Muralidhar Banechand ((1958) PLD (Supreme Court) 138) M Shahabuddin, 
AR Cornelius, Muhammad Sharif and Amiruddin Ahmad JJ. 
83 Abdullah v Cnan Group Spa ((2014) PLD (Karachi) 349) Munib Akhtar J. 
84 Lakhra Power Generation Company v Karadeniz Powership Kaya Bey ((2014) CLD (Karachi) 337) Munib 
Akhtar J; Suleman v Manager Domestic Banking, Habib Bank ((2003) CLD (Karachi) 1797) Sabihuddin Ahmad 
and Zia Pervez JJ. 
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4.6. Conclusion: International Law and Municipal Law in a Globalised World 
The role of the state in the modern world is complex. According to positivist international 
law theory, each state is sovereign. In reality, with the rise of globalisation, not even the most 
powerful of states can be entirely sovereign. Interdependence of contemporary society 
ensures that the actions of one state could have serious global implications.  
 This has led to an increasing interaction of international law and domestic law across 
a number of fields, such as human rights, environmental and international investment law, 
where at the least the same topic is subject to regulation at both the domestic and the 
international level. The EU’s regional legal order is a unique example of the integration of 
Union law into the law of the Member States. The multi-layered private international law 
(conflict of laws) rules of the EU Member States reflect the diverse competence of the 
municipal, European Union and international legal order.  
 With the rise of international law, questions begin to arise about the relationship 
between the municipal law of a particular country and the rules and principles of the 
international legal community. It has been observed that a normative character may be 
attributed to applicable municipal law in proceedings under international law before an 
international court or tribunal.   
 International law primarily relies on domestic legal and political structures for 
implementation.85 As a result of the increased interaction between international and 
municipal laws, the study of international law as it is applied and interpreted by domestic 
courts is developing into a sub-discipline termed ‘comparative international law’:86  
“Comparative international law entails identifying, analyzing, and explaining 
similarities and differences in how actors in different legal systems understand, 
interpret, apply, and approach international law.” 
Comparative international law differs from the idea of fragmentation87 and variable 
geometry.88 Instead, it focuses largely on similarities and differences between national or 
regional actors in their approaches to international law. 
 International law is a dynamic corpus of law which may materially enrich the 
domestic jurisprudence of Pakistan. The traditional view of international law as entirely 
distinct from municipal law has run its course and a more integrated approach is required. 
Ideally, the Pakistani judiciary should be at the crescendo of enlightened thought on 
international law. International law, whether derived from custom or a treaty, becomes 
                                                          
85 Wayne Sandholtz, ‘How Domestic Courts Use International Law’ (2015) 38 Fordham Int'l L.J. 595. 
86 Anthea Roberts, Paul B Stephan, Pierre-Hughes Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Comparative International Law: 
Framing the Field’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 467, 469. 
87 Fragmentation is the product of a system of laws that, by and large, lacks a sense of vertical integration or 
hierarchy: See James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (Brill 2014) 283.  
88 ‘Variable-geometry Europe’ is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration 
whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of Member States both able and willing to advance, it being 
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